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This paper discusses the epistemic value of political parties and other 
partisan associations from the standpoint of epistemic democracy. It ex-
amines whether political parties contribute to the quality of democratic 
deliberation, thus increasing the epistemic value of democratic decision-
making procedures, or represent a threat that polarizes the society and 
impedes and distorts the public deliberation. The paper introduces sev-
eral arguments that support the epistemic value of partisanship. Par-
tisan associations empower otherwise marginalized social groups or 
groups that have disproportionally small political infl uence by facilitat-
ing political education or by connecting citizens and experts who share 
the same values. Partisan associations also help us resist the epistemi-
cally damaging effects of hermeneutical (epistemic) injustice by enabling 
marginalized citizens to construct alternative discourses. However, 
though partisanship might facilitate the transmission of knowledge, this 
deliberative tool will only be used in a group of like-minded citizens (i.e. 
within a political party), thus increasing the polarization between the 
parties and citizens alike, and decreasing the epistemic value of such col-
lective decision-making procedures. The paper analyses some epistemic 
strategies (like red-teaming or building a critical thinking culture) that 
can help us avoid or (at least) reduce the epistemically damaging effects 
of polarization. However, internal action (from within a deliberative 
group) might not be enough. Making the deliberation on political issues 
public and spreading it through different forms of citizens’ organiza-
tions will ensure that political deliberation is not closed within a single 
homogenous deliberating group (i.e. the party). These practices should 
signifi cantly reduce the damaging effects of group polarization.
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Political parties have been studied for centuries, yet not much atten-
tion was brought to their epistemic value. In fact, political parties have 
often been thought of as subversive elements that endanger the epis-
temic qualities of democratic decision-making procedures: they orga-
nize citizens in order to promote the private, but not the public good 
(Rousseau 1997), they have a damaging effect on their members’ epis-
temic capacities (Atchison 2012), they polarize the democratic society 
(Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006) and even lead to destimulation 
of voter turnout (Brady, Ferejohn and Harbridge 2008). It is therefore 
very interesting to study the value of political parties from the stand-
point of epistemic democracy, a theory of democracy that ascribes to 
democracy its legitimacy-generating potential (at least in part) in vir-
tue of its ability to produce (substantively) good or correct outcomes. 
The ability of the decision-making procedure to produce legitimate de-
cisions is evaluated, in part, in regard to its ability to produce outcomes 
that are right, true or correct according to some procedure-independent 
standard. We evaluate political institutions and organizations (at least 
in part) by their ability to contribute to the procedure’s substantive 
epistemic value, i.e. its ability to produce correct decisions.1 Having 
this defi nition in mind, a few questions arise. Do political parties con-
tribute to the quality of democratic deliberation, thus increasing the 
epistemic value of democratic decision-making procedures,2 together 
with the legitimacy-generating potential of such procedures? Or is the 
opposite true that political parties polarize the society, impede and dis-
tort the public deliberation and damage the legitimacy-generating po-
tential of democratic decision-making procedures?
This paper tries to answer the abovementioned questions by com-
bining the traditional standpoint of normative political theory with 
some contemporary methods and models from social epistemology and 
group psychology. It is heavily infl uenced by Jonathan White’s and Lea 
Ypi’s The Meaning of Partisanship, though it expands well beyond the 
scope of the book, combining their approach to political partisanship 
with the epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. It aims to support 
and expand White and Ypi’s idea that political parties increase the 
epistemic value of democratic procedures (though, it seems, using a 
different approach to political legitimacy), but also to specify conditions 
in which partisanship can have this epistemic value. It is important to 
emphasize that, even if this paper fails to convince that partisanship 
1 The epistemic approach to democracy was fi rst formulated by Joshua Cohen 
(1986). The formulation used in this paper follows a (somewhat simplifi ed version of) 
David Estlund’s (2008) account of epistemic democracy.
2 This paper does not differentiate strictly between collective decision-making 
procedures and procedures of collective authorisation of decisions. The account of 
epistemic democracy presented in this paper is thus compatible with various models 
of representative democracy, as well as with the recognition of experts in politics. 
For a detailed account on the distinction between these two types of procedures see 
Pavićević and Simendić (2016).
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has epistemic value (or if it turns out to reduce the epistemic quality 
of democratic decision-making procedures), it might still have other 
(moral or political) values that support it.
The fi rst part of the paper discusses new arguments for the epis-
temic contribution of partisanship presented by White and Ypi. Orga-
nizing in political parties can empower otherwise marginalized social 
groups or groups that have disproportionally small political infl uence 
by facilitating political education or by connecting citizens and experts 
who share the same values. Furthermore, partisanship can help us 
resist the epistemically damaging effects of hermeneutical (epistemic) 
injustice by enabling marginalized citizens to construct alternative dis-
courses. The second part introduces some new arguments in support of 
the epistemic value of partisanship. These arguments highlight that 
partisanship can be a valuable tool for knowledge transmission and as 
such could represent a valuable asset for deliberative democracy. The 
danger of group polarization and crippled epistemology is reintroduced 
in the third part of the paper. Though partisanship might facilitate 
the transmission of knowledge, this deliberative tool will only be used 
in a group of like-minded citizens (i.e. within a political party), thus 
increasing the polarization between the parties and citizens alike. This 
paper uses results from contemporary empirical studies that suggest 
there is a widening gap between political parties in United States due 
to group polarization and crippled epistemology while also analyzing 
the damage these processes cause to the epistemic value of collective 
decision-making procedures. Some possible solutions are discussed in 
the fourth and the fi fth part of the paper. Namely, a deliberative group 
can use some epistemic strategies (like red-teaming or building a crit-
ical thinking culture) to avoid or (at least) reduce the epistemically 
damaging effects of polarization. However, internal action (from within 
a deliberative group) might not be enough. Making the deliberation on 
political issues public and spreading it through different forms of citi-
zens’ organizations will ensure that political deliberation is not closed 
within a single homogenous deliberating group (i.e. the party). These 
practices should not only prevent crippled epistemology, but also sig-
nifi cantly reduce the damaging effects of group polarization.
1. White and Ypi on epistemic value of partisanship
Jonathan White and Lea Ypi (2016) do not take the standard account of 
epistemic democracy as a broader normative framework for their work. 
Their approach follows and builds upon Bohman’s (1998) position, 
which shifts focus from the quality of the results of the deliberative pro-
cedure to the quality of the procedure itself. Their theory is settled in 
the framework where the focus is “shifted from the outcome of justifi ca-
tory practices to the normative signifi cance of the process” (White and 
Ypi 2011: 392, 2016: 73). They measure the epistemic value of partisan-
ship by examining its infl uence on the (intrinsic) moral and epistemic 
102 I. Cerovac, The Epistemic Value of Partisanship
quality of the collective decision-making procedure.3 Furthermore, they 
indicate and describe two mechanisms by which partisanship increases 
the epistemic value of the decision-making procedures.
First, partisanship can reduce the impact of power asymmetries on 
agents’ capacities to participate as equals in reason-giving and deci-
sion-making processes. Though formal equality of political infl uence 
represents one of the most fundamental values of democratic societ-
ies, equality is rarely achieved (and sometimes deemed unnecessary or 
even adverse) in the informal political sphere.4 Social and economic in-
equalities often spill over to the informal political sphere thus making 
some groups unable to participate as equals in democratic procedures. 
Members of powerless groups will be disadvantaged not only in regard 
to the access to political education and specialized (expert) knowledge 
but also in access to the resources needed to convey their political mes-
sage to the wider public. These inequalities in political infl uence impair 
both the moral and the epistemic value of democratic procedures thus 
endangering their legitimacy-generating potential. Partisanship helps 
us preserve that by cutting the link between social and economic pow-
er, and giving access to political education and expert knowledge. Ypi 
and White hold that partisanship plays this role by offering certain ir-
replaceable epistemic resources. Partisan forums (including party con-
ventions, branch meetings, assemblies, protests, blogs and websites) 
can then be seen as learning platforms for citizens. They empower dis-
advantaged citizens and give them epistemic resources needed for po-
litical participation. Furthermore, partisan forums have an important 
motivational role—they show disadvantaged citizens that they are not 
alone in their political struggle. Therefore, partisanship “plays an im-
portant role in ensuring the sustainability of shared political projects 
when epistemic challenges are at stake” (White and Ypi 2016: 90).
The epistemic value of partisanship is fi rst described through its 
educational role. Citizens who lack the access to education in general, 
or to political education in particular, gain new information and skills 
to make their political views more coherent, appealing and clearer to 
the wider audience. Etienne Lantier, the protagonist of Zola’s Ger-
minal, is taken to be a great example of such political education: he 
starts as a poorly educated, rebellious and unemployed young man who 
through his participation in epistemically-enriching partisan associa-
tions turns into an intellectually sophisticated activist (Zola 1983, as 
3 Fabienne Peter (2009) defended a similar position, arguing that legitimacy-
generating potential of collective decision-making procedures rests in their non-
instrumental epistemic qualities. Some arguments against this view can be found in 
Marti (2006), Estlund (2008) and Cerovac (2016).
4 I use Estlund’s (2008) differentiation between formal political sphere, which 
includes voting procedures and public elections, but also political institutions such 
as courts and legislators, and informal political sphere, which includes political 
speeches, candidate and citizen debates, opinion journalism, political advertising, 
political art and demonstrations.
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paraphrased in White and Ypi 2016). Political parties and related as-
sociations (political foundations, think tanks, informal groups or even 
trade unions) can be great platforms for systemizing and spreading 
political knowledge, and for improving some relevant skills (verbal 
and non-verbal communication, networking, management and leader-
ship skills). The second epistemic benefi t of partisanship, often closely 
connected to the fi rst one, is its ability to connect citizens and experts 
who otherwise would not come into contact. Since partisan associations 
(unlike factions) gather around some central values (and not around 
private interests of group members), they often include members from 
various backgrounds and fi elds of expertise. Their joint political effort 
and focus on the same political aims, combined with partisan forums as 
means for inter-party deliberation and learning, ensures that complex 
views and topics requiring technical knowledge can become available 
to all citizens.
Second, partisanship can help marginalized and disadvantaged 
groups to develop hermeneutic resilience. Namely, powerless groups 
are often unable to participate in the creation of collective herme-
neutical resources which leaves them unable to make sense of their 
own social experiences (or at least unable to formulate them in a way 
other citizens could understand). This is characterized as hermeneu-
tical epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007, 2013), and is often considered 
one of the effects that perpetuate social inequalities by keeping the 
members of disadvantaged groups from participating as equals in the 
process of collective decision-making.5 For example, terms like ‘sexual 
harassment’ and ‘post-natal depression’ have been created some fi fty 
years ago, though such practices and occurrences have been around for 
thousands of years. They have affected women for centuries yet until 
recently women were unable to formulate and explain what is exactly 
going on (since there were no available hermeneutical resources to dif-
ferentiate between sexual harassment and harmless fl irting). These 
instances of hermeneutic injustice were removed by organized group 
action, when members of a disadvantaged group came together, delib-
erated their social experiences and formulated plans for social engage-
ment. Ypi and White believe that partisanship associations can help 
us remedy hermeneutic (epistemic) injustice by creating new platforms 
and channels of communication. Namely, partisanship enables citizens 
to construct alternative discourses, to exchange the information they 
were unable to exchange before and to raise consciousness of the prob-
lematic aspects of common-sense thinking.
Partisanship is valuable since it offers certain irreplaceable epis-
temic resources: new channels and platforms of communication that 
enable citizens to express their social experiences and new resources 
5 Martha Nussbaum (2000) and Amartya Sen (2003) defend similar ideas by 
emphasizing how adaptive preferences can keep members of disadvantaged groups 
from formulating and even desiring policies that might improve their social and 
economic status.
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needed to process the information in a particular way, including inter-
pretative resources needed for upholding partisan commitment. White 
and Ypi (2016: 94) describe a hypothetical case of Rosa, a socialist liv-
ing in West Europe in 1989. She suddenly has to (in light of the new ev-
idence) decide whether to completely abandon the idea of socialism or 
to revise her ideas and strengthen them with what can be learned from 
the collapse of socialist regimes in East Europe. It is very diffi cult for 
her to keep both partisan commitment and her faith in socialism when 
she is unable to deliberate with her fellow associates. Political parties 
and other partisan associations can help by structuring such delibera-
tion and offering hermeneutical resources (but also expert knowledge) 
needed to uphold the partisan commitment.
White and Ypi seem to be aware that collective deliberation with 
like-minded citizens (epistemic trustees) can lead to epistemically dam-
aging results, including group polarization and the creation of echo-
chambers (Sunstein 2009). However, since their position does not eval-
uate the quality of collective decision-making procedure in its ability to 
achieve some epistemically valuable (true, correct or justifi ed) results 
but by intrinsic (purely procedural) qualities of a decision-making pro-
cedure, they do not seem to be affected by these objections. In fact, they 
are ready to accept that deliberation within partisan organizations of-
ten does not lead to epistemically best (or even decent) outcomes:
If there is a truth of the matter to be found, exposure to disagreement and 
to the discursive challenge of one’s own position may be more likely to con-
tribute to an enlightened assessment. Precisely because arguing with one’s 
political friends is more likely to consolidate one’s previous opinions and be-
liefs and develop resistance to the tendency to revisit such commitment too 
lightly, taking part in associative practices strengthens the ability to stick 
with previously held beliefs and values, despite evidence that would suggest 
the need to revisit them. (White and Ypi 2016: 95)
Epistemic value of partisan associations is therefore not outcome-ori-
ented—White and Ypi do not think that the role of partisanship (and 
its epistemic value) is to identify political projects worth pursuing but 
instead to provide means needed for sustaining them under epistemic 
pressure.
My view, which builds on the standard (outcome-oriented) account 
of epistemic democracy, is directly targeted by Sunstein’s arguments 
on group polarization and echo-chambers. This paper does not deny 
the importance of these arguments—it instead builds upon them and 
tries to determine whether there are some (instrumental, and not in-
trinsic) epistemic qualities of partisan associations, as well as whether 
partisan associations can be (at least partly) protected from epistemic 
deviations.
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2. New arguments supporting 
the epistemic value of partisanship
Although White and Ypi claim that partisanship has (only) intrinsic 
epistemic value, their arguments can also be used to extend the claim 
to instrumental epistemic value. Epistemic resources (e.g. partisan fo-
rums) that reduce the impact of power asymmetries on the political 
infl uence of the citizens by providing them political education can help 
us reach epistemically better outcomes. Furthermore, partisan asso-
ciations can help marginalized and disadvantaged groups develop her-
meneutic resilience, thus enabling them to make sense of their social 
experiences and to participate in decision-making processes that aim 
at producing better laws, policies and decisions. White and Ypi have 
thus (perhaps unintentionally) presented initial arguments supporting 
the instrumental epistemic value of partisanship.
This part of the paper analyses some positive effects of partisanship 
on knowledge transmission, building upon White and Ypi’s account 
of partisanship associations that provide some epistemic resources 
that other kinds of associations would be unable to deliver. Namely, 
although deliberating with like-minded citizens often leads to some 
forms of ‘crippled epistemology’ (Sunstein 2009), it can also have some 
positive epistemic effects, primarily in the area of knowledge transmis-
sion from experts to citizens.
Democratic procedures have often been criticized for their inabil-
ity to adequately incorporate specialized and expert knowledge in the 
decision-making processes. Experts6 often withdraw from public de-
liberation thus leaving those who remain engaged in the deliberative 
process to face extreme diffi culties by trying to get the necessary trust 
from the citizens, and in making their arguments available for those 
who lack the specialized knowledge (Solomon 2006, Prijić-Samaržija 
2017). Can intra-party deliberation represent a better institutional ar-
rangement than public deliberation when it comes to employment of 
expert knowledge in collective decision-making processes? This paper 
proceeds by claiming that there are a few important aspects of par-
tisanship that make deliberation conducted within such associations 
epistemically better than the one conducted within non-partisan as-
sociations or within general public. Unlike some non-partisan associa-
tions (or the public), political parties are characterized by epistemically 
relevant features such as solidarity, overlapping understanding, com-
petition and sanctions7 (Christiano 2012). These features can improve 
6 Discussion on experts and expertism in contemporary epistemology is very 
broad and diverse. This paper endorses a widely accepted defi nition by Adam Elga 
(2007), who claims that experts are those who are considerably less likely to have 
incorrect belief regarding certain issue. Experts are therefore seen simply as ‘not-
epistemic-peers’.
7 This does not imply that political parties are the only type of association 
characterized by these features. Some religious associations, for example, might 
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the knowledge transmission from experts to citizens, thus improving 
both the intrinsic and the instrumental epistemic quality of a decision-
making process.
First, consider the positive effects solidarity has on the process of 
knowledge transmission. Accepting the testimony of others, even if 
they are experts, calls for assessment of their trustworthiness (Prijić-
Samaržija 2011). This can be very diffi cult to achieve since both techni-
cal expertise and values held by experts might be inaccessible to regu-
lar citizens. Partisans, however, know that their partisan experts hold 
the same goals, values and ideals as themselves. Furthermore, parti-
sans can see that other members of their party, those more competent 
in the relevant fi elds, recognize and praise the technical expertise of 
the experts in question, and are therefore more prone to trust them 
even when their opportunities and capacities for monitoring experts 
are limited. This is of crucial importance when experts have techni-
cal knowledge that is diffi cult or almost impossible to explain to non-
experts. Expert knowledge cannot have the appropriate weight in the 
(democratic) decision-making process unless the experts are backed-up 
by non-experts who do not have the complete grasp of the knowledge in 
question but nonetheless defer to the (epistemic) authority of experts. 
This deference is facilitated by partisan solidarity.
Second, since parties are plural associations and have members 
with expertise in various areas, they can achieve a form of overlap-
ping understanding among members. This becomes useful when two 
or more persons share some expertise but do not share other expertise. 
For example, A knows about disciplines a, b and c, while B knows about 
b, c and d—they overlap at b and c, and can translate some of their 
knowledge about a or d through ideas of b and c (Christiano 2012). 
Of course, some knowledge will be lost or simply cannot be properly 
transferred through overlapping understanding. This depends on the 
sophistication of theories in question, but also on the proximity of dis-
ciplines. It will be much easier for a political scientist to transfer his 
knowledge using overlapping understanding to an economist than to a 
physicist. However, overlapping understanding enables the transfer of 
specialized knowledge from two or more agents to the general public. 
A complex economic theory can be transferred to a political scientist, 
who can then combine it with his knowledge of the legal and political 
background and transfer it onwards to politicians or perhaps to rela-
tively sophisticated journalists (Christiano 2012: 39–40). Politicians 
could then create laws and public policies based on (or at least taking 
into consideration) that specialized expert knowledge, and journalists 
could explain what they understand to ordinary citizens. Parties are 
composed of people profi cient in different disciplines and gather ex-
perts in various fi elds, thus enabling the transfer of knowledge through 
overlapping understanding.
exhibit some or even all of the epistemic features described above.
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Third, unlike many civil society associations, political parties di-
rectly compete for power and infl uence. The competition between par-
ties fosters the competition between different political programs in the 
public arena, with each party trying to build a strong argument for its 
program and to fi nd mistakes in the justifi cation of other parties’ pro-
grams. Parties have to rely on the knowledge of experts both to produce 
the program that advances their core values properly and to recognize 
when antoher party’s program rests on mistakes that can be scientifi -
cally exposed. The competition between political parties has an epis-
temic (though not only epistemic) dimension, and it can thus increase 
the epistemic quality of political decision-making process.
Fourth, political parties have mechanisms for monitoring and eval-
uation of the work done by experts and for sanctioning experts when 
they depart from party’s core values. Just like academic community 
can sanction scientists for methodological issues, political parties can 
sanction partisan-experts who betray the values of the party. This si-
multaneously builds intraparty solidarity by making it easier for party 
members to trust party experts and makes the system more democratic 
since it prevents (or at least discourages) experts from abandoning val-
ues supported by party members and the party in general.
To sum up, the initial argument by White and Ypi, supported with 
Christiano’s position on positive effects of partisanship on knowledge 
transmission, shows that some aspects of partisanship (done properly) 
promote both the epistemic and the moral value of democratic decision-
making procedures. Partisanship makes procedures fairer by removing 
some obstacles in the informal political public sphere that endanger 
fairness of the decision-making process. It also makes procedures more 
epistemically reliable by removing damaging effects of hermeneutical 
epistemic injustice and by enabling transference of knowledge between 
experts and non-experts. However, the question remains whether these 
epistemically positive aspects of partisanship exceed the damage it can 
cause to the collective decision-making process.
3. Group polarization and crippled epistemology
The problem of group polarization represents a permanent challenge 
for all kinds of epistemic democracy, including both purely procedural 
accounts that aim for some intrinsic epistemic values inherent in the 
decision-making procedure and rational procedural accounts that aim 
for substantive quality of political outcomes. Cass Sunstein (2005) de-
scribes group polarization as a statistical regularity when members of 
deliberative group embrace more extreme views than the ones they’ve 
had before the deliberation. Various people holding similar views thus, 
after the deliberation with like-minded citizens, end up holding more 
extreme versions of these views. For example, a group of moderate 
feminists (or nationalists or liberals) will, after repeated inter-group 
deliberation, become a group of extreme feminists (or nationalist or 
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liberals). The shift can be explained by every member of a group chang-
ing his or her views through deliberation with like-minded epistemic 
peers. Group polarization therefore presents a serious epistemic prob-
lem since citizens’ views are changed only in one direction (towards the 
more extreme version) regardless of any reasons for or against such a 
view.
The effect is much stronger in ‘deliberative enclaves’ (Sunstein 2002, 
2005, 2009), groups of like-minded persons deliberating on a regular 
basis for a longer period of time. However, political parties can also be 
described as ‘groups of like-minded persons deliberating on a regular 
basis for a longer period of time’. After all, those are some of the key 
components of political parties: they (i) are composed of like-minded 
or similar-minded citizens, they (ii) encourage and foster deliberation 
between party members, and fi nally, they (iii) are long term political 
projects persisting for longer periods of time (unlike protest groups or 
civil initiatives). Political parties might thus be seen as a specifi c form 
of deliberative enclaves. This raises doubts regarding the epistemic 
value of political parties and the negative impact they might have on 
collective decision-making processes.
Group polarization leads to more extreme political views and ex-
treme views require extreme cognitive conditions to be protected and 
nourished. This often leads to ‘crippled epistemology’ (Hardin 2002), 
another dangerous effect that takes place when, in order to preserve 
extreme views from challenges, groups adopt rules that discourage or 
even sanction deliberation with persons of different (political) views. 
Namely, since extreme views produced by group polarization are not 
grounded in good epistemic reasons (but are often created despite them), 
it is very diffi cult to continue defending them in open deliberation with 
citizens who do not share such views and introduce new reasons and 
arguments in the public debate. A simple method for dealing with such 
epistemic challenges is argumentum ad hominem, a fallacious argu-
mentative strategy that “attacks the characteristic or authority of the 
author without addressing the substance of the argument” (Graham 
2008). Members of extreme groups thus often employ this argumenta-
tive strategy to avoid criticism or objections to their views while delib-
erative groups often encourage and promote such strategies. Political 
adversaries and citizens who do not share the same political views as 
members of deliberative enclaves are characterized as stupid or ma-
levolent (or both). This removes or weakens the demand to answer 
to objections and critiques from such citizens, thus keeping extreme 
views safe from possible challenges. This kind of discourse is becoming 
dominant in contemporary politics, with prominent examples like Ann 
Coulter (2004, as cited in Talisse 2009), a conservative commentator 
who advises her readers to talk to liberals only “if you must”, and Mi-
chael Savage who claims that his liberal opponents suffer from “mental 
disorder” (Savage 2005, as cited in Talisse 2009) or Al Franken (2004) 
 I. Cerovac, The Epistemic Value of Partisanship 109
characterizing republicans as “lying liars” and “stupid white men”.
Ideological division between political parties has been growing rap-
idly for the past fi fteen years. The rise of new populist, extreme far-
right and far-left parties in Europe supports this assumption, though 
it makes empirical research more diffi cult since it is no longer possible 
to track political attitudes of party members through longer periods 
of time (since some of these parties are only a few years old). Howev-
er, empirical data from the United States, where political attitudes of 
supporters of the two dominant parties have been tracked for decades, 
indicates the growing gap between liberals and conservatives (Pew Re-
search Centre 2014).
The growing gap between political attitudes of liberals and republicans 
need not be a problem in itself, however, it brings along many epis-
temically damaging features that simultaneously enhance group po-
larization and reduce social trust between citizens supporting different 
political parties. Group polarization is increased when political values 
and attitudes descend to the private sphere, with growing number of 
liberals rejecting to marry someone who is a gun owner and growing 
number of conservatives refusing to marry someone who is of different 
race or is born and raised outside the US (Pew Research Centre 2014). 
Social trust is reduced with increasing numbers of citizens seeing their 
political opponents not merely as someone they disagree with, but also 
as a potential threat to the nation’s well-being.
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Data shows that (in 2014) 38 percent of democrats see the Republican 
Party as unfavorable (compared to 16 percent in 1994), with 27 percent 
seeing the opposing party as a threat to the nation’s well-being. Simi-
larly, (in 2014) 43 percent of republicans see the Democrat Party as 
unfavorable (compared to 17 percent in 1994), and more than a third 
see the opposing party as a threat to the nation’s well-being (Pew Re-
search Centre 2014). Keeping this in mind, it is very diffi cult to expect 
that public deliberation in conditions of group polarization and crippled 
epistemology can yield results of decent epistemic quality.
White and Ypi are aware of these problems, yet their position seems 
to be immune to these objections since they are not defending the stan-
dard account of epistemic democracy. They acknowledge group polar-
ization; yet do not think that it endangers their position. “Though de-
liberation with epistemic trustees leads to group polarization (rather 
than improving the quality of arguments), whether it is bad depends 
on the nature and value of one’s commitment” (White and Ypi 2016: 
96). However, it seems that group polarization (and crippled episte-
mology that follows), undermines the mechanisms needed for public 
justifi cation and public reason-giving. Namely, partisans start seeing 
their political opponents as enemies—as stupid or malevolent people 
(or both). Consequently, they start seeing public justifi cation as unnec-
essary—they ask themselves why they would owe public justifi cation 
to stupid or malevolent people. Group polarization represents a threat 
not only to the (standard) epistemic conception of deliberative democ-
racy, but also to virtually any form of democracy that relies on public 
deliberation as a method of political justifi cation, including White’s and 
Ypi’s position.
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Some might argue that group polarization represents a problem 
that can easily be settled. Though political parties might prefer to keep 
their supporters loyal and isolated from the arguments coming from 
the other side (crippled epistemology), they also want to win elections. 
And if a party wants to win elections, it will have to embrace and at 
least incorporate the views of the general, non-polarized population in 
its political program. The general public will thus keep parties from po-
larizing (White and Ypi 2011, Biale and Bistagnino 2018). The empiri-
cal data from the US, however, points in the opposite direction. Along 
with political parties, the general public is polarizing as well, with 
leaners being more similar to partisans than to other independents. 
Polarized news media and echo chambers created by social media have 
a strong impact on non-partisan citizens, who start behaving similar to 
their partisan fellows (Pew Research Centre 2014). It seems that par-
tisanship (as a road to group polarization and crippled epistemology) 
introduces problems for all forms of deliberative democracy, including 
both the epistemic view I defend and the public-reasoning view em-
braced by White and Ypi. Knowledge transmission mechanisms and 
new epistemic resources partisanship offers are not enough to preserve 
its epistemic value. If we want to argue that partisanship increases the 
epistemic quality of democratic decisions (but also if we want to argue 
that it is compatible with public reason-giving), we have to address 
group polarization and offer some mechanisms to reduce its damaging 
effects.
4. Internal answer
Building upon White and Ypi’s position regarding epistemic value of 
partisanship, and pushing it even further by adopting the standard 
account of epistemic democracy, I want to sketch possible remedies for 
the group polarization problem. This part of the paper examines some 
party-oriented solutions, while the fi nal part focuses on necessary so-
cial and political transformations.
One way of fi ghting group polarization is by making changes in 
the internal organization of the party. Changing how party members 
deliberate and make decisions between themselves might help reduce 
the damaging effects of group polarization and prevent the develop-
ment of crippled epistemology. Keeping in mind the devastating effects 
group polarization can have on the society in general, as well as on the 
legitimacy and epistemic quality of democratic decision in particular, 
parties upholding liberal and democratic values should try to prevent 
epistemically undesirable changes among their members. Changing 
one’s views regardless of reasons (or even despite them) and adopting 
cognitive and deliberative norms that disregard arguments of others 
because of argumentum ad hominem fallacy represents epistemically 
undesirable behavior that parties have a duty to prevent, destimulate 
and sanction. There are a few useful methods borrowed from group 
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psychology that might help parties fi ght crippled epistemology. I dis-
cuss briefl y two such methods in the rest of this part.
First, parties should try to build a critical thinking culture within 
the organization itself. Instead of simply endorsing and following par-
ty’s values, opinions and policies, members should be encouraged to 
deliberate on them and to adopt a wide range of epistemic virtues (e.g. 
toleration, willingness to argue with others and defend one’s views, 
and disgust towards rhetorical fi gures that lead to logical fallacies). 
This recommendation has two goals. First, when widespread delibera-
tion within party is allowed or even encouraged, party members might 
realize that their organization is not as homogenous as they originally 
believed—though most (or even all) party members endorse and agree 
upon certain political values, they might disagree on laws, policies 
and political decision their party promotes to achieve its aims. Critical 
thinking culture will thus result in a more heterogeneous organization 
that is less vulnerable to group polarization and crippled epistemology. 
Second, members of parties that promote critical thinking will be less 
stressed if their views are challenged. In fact, members of such parties 
will often start discussions with their political opponents believing that 
their position is supported by the best reasons and arguments, while 
also holding that they have a duty to defend it in front of others.
Second, political parties can use red teaming (Sunstein and Hastie 
2015), a famous strategy originally used in military training, where red 
team plays an adversary role and genuinely tries to defeat the primary 
team in a simulated mission. This is a very useful method for improv-
ing the effectiveness of an organization, especially for organizations 
with strict hierarchy and fi xed ways of approaching problems. Many 
law, computer fi rms, research institutions (e.g. NASA, IBM, SAIC), as 
well as government agencies, use similar strategies to understand the 
weaknesses of their side of a case or a theory. Red teaming is thus 
an upgraded version of devil’s advocate and requires the positions of 
other parties to be viewed in their full strength (and not as a straw 
man position intentionally misinterpreted to befame the political op-
ponents), enabling partisans to see that their opponents are neither 
stupid nor malevolent. However, this method can successfully remove 
some epistemically damaging effects of crippled epistemology only if 
red teams are used to challenge the content of parties’ political views 
and not just the rhetorical fi gures and PR strategies.8 Nonetheless, 
8 We can see members of other political parties as malevolent or stupid and 
still use red reaming to improve our political performance. Parties’ red teams often 
investigate whether political opponents can use some misinterpretation of political 
messages during electoral campaigns to turn the very message against the party 
that issued it. Using rhetorical fi gures and political propaganda strategies they can 
strengthen the political message and protect it from misinterpretation, and this can 
be a good thing from the epistemic standpoint. However, it will not protect us from 
crippled epistemology. Namely, we can still see our political rivals as malevolent 
(e.g. as those who try to manipulate the citizens in their favor), and use red teams to 
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parties have a strong reason to have red teams focusing on the content 
of their political program. Apart from normative reasons to address the 
content of opponent’s views, parties are aware that the public opinion 
is shaped not only by their political messages, but also by journalists, 
political analysts, scientists and other experts who focus on the content 
of party’s political program. Red teams should try to produce the best 
possible criticism, taking the views of party’s political opponents as 
intelligent and well supported. This should enable party members to 
review various objections to their political views or to public policies 
they advance, which is exactly what crippled epistemology normally 
prevents them from doing. Being aware of your party’s weaknesses and 
of other parties’ strengths is a welcomed resource in political competi-
tion, and a valuable epistemic state standing in opposition to the norms 
of crippled epistemology.
This part of the paper indicates some useful epistemic resources 
that can be employed within political parties to block the effects of 
group polarization and crippled epistemology. The far-reaching hope 
is that the use of such resources could decrease the negative epistemic 
impact of group polarization and crippled epistemology, thus preserv-
ing the epistemic value of political parties in a democratic decision-
making process. A reasonable worry, however, strikes us when we try 
to articulate the reason why the parties would be motivated to act in 
such epistemically virtuous manner. Knowing your weaknesses and 
other parties’ strengths can be useful, but why should most members of 
a party be aware of this? Why not simply have a small group of experts 
focusing on possible weaknesses of our proposals and advising the lead-
ership of the party, with most of the party members still polarized and 
motivated to vote since they see opposing parties as stupid and danger-
ous? It seems that, in order to block the effects of group polarization 
and crippled epistemology, we need more than a list of internal mea-
sures the party can (but does not have to) employ. We need to address 
the problems from a wider perspective.
Though many hold that political parties should implement the meth-
ods described in the previous part, no one really expects that they will 
actually do so. Endorsing these methods might be like cooperating in a 
prisoner’s dilemma case—it is an option everyone would benefi t from, 
yet also an option no one will embrace unless there is an instrument 
that will ensure that everyone embraces it. This is why Sunstein (2007, 
as cited in Talisse 2017: 113) prescribes the introduction of “legal mea-
sures that could limit a doxastic group’s capacity to enclave”. He clearly 
does not count on already polarized groups to welcome the opinions and 
critiques of their political opponents, but instead aims for an institu-
tional design that would impede the creation of echo chambers within 
protect our agenda from simple rhetorical criticism, without engaging the content of 
our political views or the substantial critiques articulated by our political opponents.
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groups.9 Following Sunstein’s example, one way of fi ghting group po-
larization would be to introduce legal measures that ensure the estab-
lishment of critical thinking culture within political parties. This is an 
internal answer to the group polarization problem since, even though 
the regulation comes from outside the party, it is concerned with how 
the intra-party deliberation is shaped. I am not inherently against such 
regulation but I do not think it is up to political philosophers to devise 
exact legal means that could be used. Furthermore, there is a justi-
fi ed skepticism whether such internal answers will succeed in fi ghting 
crippled epistemology in an already polarized world.
5. External answer
So far we have focused on institutional and legal measures that could 
help prevent the development of crippled epistemology within political 
parties by re-shaping the intra-party deliberation. Alternative solu-
tion, one briefl y discussed in this part of the paper, is to change the ex-
ternal conditions that lead to crippled epistemology. Namely, crippled 
epistemology perpetuates itself when citizens attempt to protect their 
beliefs by “keeping themselves in the company only of others who share 
their beliefs” (Hardin 2002: 10). This is the reason why extreme groups 
often try to prohibit or limit their members’ interaction with citizens 
outside the group—they promote extreme religious dogmas, conspiracy 
theories, pseudo-histories and other epistemic mechanisms to keep 
their members in the company of only like-minded people. Many closed 
religious sects, for example, use similar mechanisms to discourage the 
interaction between their members and the outside world. Such orga-
nizations are usually totalitarian in a sense that they try to regulate 
every aspect of members’ private and public life.
Major political parties, on the other hand, usually cannot afford to 
be as epistemically closed as religious sects. Their members are often 
also members of various non-political associations, organizations and 
groups. One might be a member of some political party, but she might 
also enjoy football and be a member of a local team’s supporters’ club, 
sing in a neighborhood’s choir, be engaged at the workplace as a mem-
ber of a trade union, spend her free time talking about science fi ction 
within a book discussion club, and defend animal rights as a member of 
some animal welfare association. Though these are all non-political or-
ganizations, it is very diffi cult to believe that some political issues will 
not be (at least partly) discussed or addressed there. Even if there is no 
substantive political discussion among members of such associations, 
members will very likely know political views of other members within 
the organization. They will share some common goals with other mem-
bers who do not share their political views, they will work together to 
9 For example, Sunstein holds that websites of extreme parties and groups 
should be legally required to incorporate links to opposing websites.
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achieve them, and they will be able to see that these members, though 
they are their political opponents, are neither stupid nor malevolent. 
The same goes in both directions: members of supporters’ clubs of op-
posing football teams might avoid the danger of group polarization by 
being members of the same political party and collaborating in the local 
branch of the party.
When citizens are members of various organizations, associations 
and informal groups, mixed with people holding different political 
views, political deliberation will not be closed within a single homog-
enous deliberating group. Even if it remains closed, the danger of 
crippled epistemology (characterized by demonization of political op-
ponents which leads to the lack of social interaction with those outside 
the group) will be removed.
We should aim for an institutional design that promotes and pro-
tects citizens’ plural identities. This calls for laws and public policies 
that help strengthen and further develop civil society associations, par-
ticularly those who have citizens with different and opposing politi-
cal views among their members. Namely, such associations serve an 
additional purpose (apart from the one they have identifi ed as their 
main aim)—they help us impede group polarization and block crippled 
epistemology.
6. Conclusion
Political parties gather citizens with similar political views. This is si-
multaneously the source of their epistemic worth and the epistemic 
danger they represent to the quality of democratic decision-making 
process. On the one hand, having like-minded members facilitates the 
transmission of knowledge and helps in the development of hermeneu-
tic resilience. On the other hand, political parties are often seen as 
vessels of polarization since they gather like-minded citizens and often 
try to present their opponents as stupid or malevolent. Group polariza-
tion and crippled epistemology endanger both the epistemic and the 
moral value of democratic decision-making procedures. They represent 
a threat to all forms of deliberative democracy, including both epis-
temic and non-epistemic approaches to the value of public deliberation. 
Finally, they threaten to overwhelm the positive effects of partisan-
ship, turning political parties into enemies of public deliberation, i.e. 
into entities that produce more epistemic harm than epistemic good. 
Introducing certain internal norms (the promotion of critical thinking 
culture and red teaming within a political party) and external condi-
tions (institutional promotion and protection of citizens’ plural identi-
ties through special support for civil society organizations) could reduce 
epistemically and morally damaging features of group polarization and 
crippled epistemology.
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